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Abstract
For international environmental agreements aiming at world e ciency in the presence of trans-
boundary  ow pollution, it is known that, in a static context, e ciency and stability in the sense
of the core of a cooperative game can be achieved using appropriately de ned transfers between
the countries involved. However, for accumulating pollutants, such as CO2 in the atmosphere, a
dynamic analysis is required.
This paper provides a transfer scheme for which a core property is proved analytically in
a dynamic (closed-loop) game theoretic context. The characteristic function of the cooperative
dynamic game yielding this result is discussed and an algorithm to compute the transfers numer-
ically is presented and tested on an example. The transfers are also compared with an open-loop
formulation of the model.
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1. Introduction
This paper presents a cooperative game theoretic analysis of the economics of inter-
national agreements on transnational pollution control, when the environmental damage
arises from stock pollutants that accumulate (and possibly decay). The issues raised
by the necessity of cooperation amongst the countries involved, if a social optimum is
to be achieved, have already been addressed in the literature in terms of game theory
concepts; see e.g. M  aler (1989). However, most of these contributions have only dealt
with static (one shot) games, which are only suitable for  ow pollution models. With
stock pollutants the problem acquires an intertemporal dimension. In this case, dynamic
game theory is a more appropriate tool of analysis, as is done in, e.g. van der Ploeg
and de Zeeuw (1992), Kaitala et al. (1992), Hoel (1992), Tahvonen (1994), Petrosjan
and Zaccour (1995).
With exception of the last paper, these contributions leave aside the issue of the
voluntary implementation of the international optimum. This is an important drawback
since no supranational authority can be called upon to impose the optimum in a context
where the countries’ interest in cooperation diverges strongly between one another, and
especially if some countries loose when the social optimum is implemented. In view
of ensuring such implementation, it has often been suggested that  nancial transfers
between the countries involved would provide incentives towards cooperation. 1
This property, understood in the sense of the core of a cooperative game, has in e ect
been demonstrated by Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997), who propose a particular
transfer scheme based on parameters re ecting the relative intensities of the countries’
environmental preferences.
This result, established for  ow pollutants only (that is, in a static game model), has
been extended by Germain et al. (1998a) to the larger context of open-loop dynamic
games. But this extension su ers from the fact that it implies the restrictive assumption
that negotiations take place once and for all and bear on emissions trajectories that ex-
tend until the end of the planning horizon. Agreements are thus binding all along. The
aim of the present paper is precisely to relax this assumption: here, cooperation is ne-
gotiated at each period, i.e. players reevaluate at each time the interest of cooperation,
taking account of the current stock of pollutant. This approach is one of closed-loop
(or feedback) dynamic games.
In this context,  nancial transfers are considered again. They are now formulated
in such a way that they induce cooperation in the core-theoretic sense at each period.
The model thus yields a sequence of cooperative international agreements. This result
is obtained under more general convexity conditions than in the earlier attempt by
Germain et al. (1998b) that was restricted to linear damage cost functions.
Other approaches to the cooperation issue concentrate on the stable number of sig-
natories by considering the trade-o  for an individual country between joining some
1 In a two-countries framework, Petrosjan and Zaccour (1995) use  nancial transfers to obtain a cooperative
solution as a Nash equilibrium. However, being limited to two countries, they cannot deal with the issue
of coalitions, which is one of our aims here. Kverndokk (1994) deals both with coalitions and  nancial
transfers for the greenhouse gas problem, but he resorts neither to dynamic games, nor to cooperative ones.M. Germain et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 79–99 81
coalition and staying out of that coalition (see Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett,
1994). A critical comparison between these approaches and the one of this paper is
given in Tulkens (1998). On the other hand, one must emphasize that this paper does
not intend to describe the way actual international negotiations are conducted (e.g. the
Kyoto protocol). It chooses instead a normative approach, identifying transfers that
make agreements less likely to be broken. For an alternative approach in this sense,
see Bahn et al. (1998).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the international stock
pollutant model and characterizes the international optimum as well as the closed-loop
Nash non-cooperative equilibrium. In Section 3,  nancial transfers are formulated so
as to ensure that each country is not worse o  when it participates, either in the
 nite or in the in nite horizon case. In Section 4, transfers are further speci ed so
as to achieve stability in the core-theoretic sense, followed by a discussion of the
characteristic function of dynamic cooperative games yielding that result.
Section 5 describes an algorithm that solves the model developed in Sections 3 and
4, and presents numerical results obtained by application of the algorithm to a simple
climatic change model with three regions, including a comparison with the open-loop
case. Section 6 is a conclusion.
2. International optimality and non-cooperative equilibrium
Our economic model is written in discrete time. Consider n countries indexed by
i∈N = {1;2;:::;n} and some planning period T = {1;2;:::;T} (T, the planning
horizon, is a positive integer, possibly in nite). In each country, pollution is entailed
by economic activity: let Et=(E1t;:::;E nt)  denote the vector of the di erent countries’
emissions of a certain pollutant at time t. These emissions spread uniformly in the
atmosphere and contribute to a stock of pollutant S according to the equation




where the initial stock of pollutant S0 is given and where   is the pollutant’s natural rate
of degradation (0¡ ¡1). This model describes, for example, the basics of the climate
change problem where the  ows of emissions of greenhouse gases accumulate into a
stock, which only gradually assimilates and which is the cause of the climate change.
This stock of pollutant causes damages to each country’s environment. For country
i (i∈N), these damages during period t are measured in monetary terms by the func-
tion Di(St), where Di is supposed to be a di erentiable, increasing and convex function
of the current stock St (D 
i ¿0;D   
i ¿ 0). As described in (1), this current stock is
a function of the inherited stock St−1 and of the current emissions Et. The only way
to control the stock of pollutant is through the control of emissions. 2 More precisely,
each country i can reduce its own emissions, and the cost of doing this is described
2 That is reducing pollution is done through the reduction of emissions, and not through the cleaning of
the environment.82 M. Germain et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 79–99
by a di erentiable, decreasing and strictly convex function Ci(Ei)( C 
i ¡0;C  
i ¿0).
Ci(Ei) measures the total costs incurred by country i from limiting its emissions to
Ei. The convexity of the function re ects the intuitive idea that the marginal cost of
reducing emissions is higher for lower levels of emissions.
From Eq. (1), it is clear that the damages to the environment of country i will depend
on the emissions of all countries. In what follows, we will consider two di erent modes
of behaviour of the countries. A  rst one assumes that they behave in an internationally
optimal way, i.e. that each of them takes account of the impact of its pollution not
only on itself but on all other countries as well. In this case, countries jointly choose
at each period their emission levels in order to minimize total discounted costs, i.e. for










subject to the constraints (1) and Eit ¿ 0( ∀t ∈T;∀i∈N),   is the discount factor
(0¡ 6 1). According to Bellman’s principle of optimality, the solution can be found














[Ci(Eit)+Di(St)] +  W(t +1 ;S t)
 
;
t =1 ;2;:::;T− 1 (3)
subject to the constraints (1) and Eit¿0( ∀t ∈T;∀i∈N). In (2) and (3), W is called
the value function. As the total costs of all countries are minimized, the resulting tra-
jectories of emissions and stock constitute the international optimum. The convexity
of the functions Ci and Di (∀i∈N) su ces to guarantee that the minimum exists and
is unique.
In an alternative mode of behaviour, one may assume that countries behave non-
cooperatively in the sense of a Nash equilibrium, where each of them minimizes at
each period only its own discounted costs, taking as given the emissions of the other









subject to the constraints (1), Eit ¿ 0 and Ejt j  = i given. Within the framework of






{[Ci(Eit)+Di(St)] +  Ni(t +1 ;S t)};t =1 ;2;:::;T− 1 (5)
under the constraints (1) and Eit ¿ 0 ∀t ∈T. The convexity of the functions Ci and
Di su ces to guarantee that the Nash equilibrium exists and is unique.M. Germain et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 79–99 83
The family of trajectories of emissions thus determined for each i in N, together with
the resulting stock, constitute a non-cooperative feedback Nash equilibrium (Ba  sar and
Olsder, 1995). 3 The value functions Ni characterize the costs-to-go at this equilibrium
for each country i. The emissions are functions of the current stock of pollutant and
the equilibrium has the property of Markov perfectness (Maskin and Tirole, 1988), in
the sense that it remains an equilibrium if the game is restarted at any intermediate
year t from any value of the stock of pollutant.
At the international optimum, and contrary to what happens at the Nash equilibrium,
each country takes account of the impact of its pollution on the environment of all
other countries. Therefore, from a collective point of view, the international optimum
is better than the feedback Nash equilibrium. Nothing ensures, however, that this is
also true at the individual level. Indeed, countries being di erent, it is possible that
some country at sometime t is better o  at the non-cooperative equilibrium than at the
optimum, so that cooperation is not pro table for this country (at least at time t). The
same can occur for subsets of countries—i.e. coalitions—in the sense that, by limiting
cooperation to such coalitions, the members of the latter could be better o  than at
the international optimum. The aim of this paper is to show that there exist  nancial
transfers between countries that can make each one of them interested in achieving
the international optimum at all periods t (individual rationality), and are such that, in
addition, no sub-group of countries has ever an incentive to form a coalition and enact
an optimum for itself only (coalitional rationality). We are thus aiming at a cooperative
international optimum.
To make the above argument precise, it is important to state explicitly what the
fallback position is for each country when no transfers occurs. At each time t one
could take the non-cooperative feedback Nash equilibrium from t onwards as such
point of reference, and determine the transfers accordingly. However, one should not
neglect the fact that countries know that later on, thanks to the cooperative transfers to
which they will have access, they will be better o  than at the non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium. Hence, a better point of reference at time t is: non-cooperation at time t,
followed by cooperation afterwards. 4
This is a rational expectations argument, that we introduce formally in Section 3
to deal with individual rationality, and that we use again in Section 4 to deal with
coalitional rationality in the framework of a dynamic cooperative game.
3. Transfers to sustain individual rationality at the international optimum
3.1. Transfers at  nal time T
Let us start by determining which transfers yield gains for all countries when they
cooperate in the last period, for any level of the stock of pollutant S inherited from the
3 See M  aler and de Zeeuw (1998) and van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992) for applications of such an
equilibrium to acid rains and climate change, respectively.
4 This idea was already put forward in Houba and de Zeeuw (1995) in the framework of a dynamic
bargaining problem.84 M. Germain et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 79–99
past. In the non-cooperative equilibrium the countries are supposed to solve problem
(4). Country i’s total cost is then
Ni(T;S)=Ci(EN
iT)+Di(SN
T );i ∈N; (6)
where EN
iT denotes the emission equilibrium level and SN
T denotes the resulting stock
of pollutant given by
SN










iT is the optimal emission level and S∗
T is the optimal stock of pollutant, given
by
S∗














  =N(T;S): (10)
The di erence between the two sides of this inequality measures the ecological surplus
resulting from international cooperation.
However, (10) is not su cient to ensure cooperation. Indeed, if ∃i∈N such that
Wi(T;S)¿N i(T;S), then country i will not cooperate without  nancial compensation
for the higher cost it incurs. Since dynamic programming reduces the choice of emis-
sions to one period at the time, one can use the transfers formula proposed by Chander
and Tulkens (1997) in a static framework. Let
 i(T;S)=−[Wi(T;S) − Ni(T;S)] +  i;T[W(T;S) − N(T;S)] (11)
be the transfer (¡0 if received, ¿0 if paid) to country i at time T, where  i;T ∈]0;1[;
∀i∈N and
 n
i=1  i;T = 1. Then country i’s total cost including transfers becomes
˜ Wi(T;S)=Wi(T;S)+ i(T;S): (12)
By construction, the budget of the transfers de ned by (11) is balanced (i.e.
 n
i=1
 i(T;S) = 0). Since
˜ Wi(T;S) − Ni(T;S)= i;T[W(T;S) − N(T;S)] 6 0; ∀i∈N (13)
cooperation with transfers is individually rational at time T, in the sense that each
country has interest to participate whatever the inherited stock of pollutant S. 5
5 The fact that  i;T cannot be equal to 0 ensures that country i will bene t from cooperation if
W(T;S)¡N(T;S). The fact that  i;T cannot be equal to 1 excludes that country i monopolizes all the
gains of cooperation.M. Germain et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 79–99 85
3.2. Transfers at earlier periods
Countries know that, whatever they do at T − 1,  nancial transfers exist (de ned
by (11)) that make the international optimum at T preferable for each of them with
respect to the non-cooperative equilibrium. Let us assume that these transfers induce
cooperation, 6 and that countries therefore expect, at T − 1, that they will cooperate
in period T. This is the rational expectations assumption announced at the end of
Section 2. The problem we wish to consider now is whether under this assumption
transfers can be designed that make the countries interested to cooperate at T − 1a s
well.
In the absence of cooperation at T −1, each country i minimizes its own discounted
total costs over the two periods T − 1 and T, expecting cooperation and transfers in
T. Thus, given the emissions of the other countries, country i solves problem (5) for
t = T − 1 with Ni under the min operator replaced by ˜ Wi. This leads to
Vi(T − 1;S) = min
Ei;T−1
{[Ci(Ei;T−1)+Di(ST−1)] +   ˜ Wi(T;ST−1)};i ∈N (14)
under the constraints (1) and Ei;T−1 ¿ 0, ∀i∈N. 7 This yields an equilibrium char-
acterized at time T − 1 by emission levels EV
T−1 as functions of the initial stock S at
time T − 1. The value function
Vi(T − 1;S)=Ci(EV
i;T−1)+Di(SV









denotes country i’s discounted equilibrium costs. We will call this equilibrium the
fallback non-cooperative equilibrium at time T − 1.
In the case where all countries cooperate, they solve problem (3) for t = T − 1.
Optimal levels of emissions and of the resulting stock of pollutant are denoted by
E∗
T−1 and S∗
T−1, respectively. Both are functions of S. This yields
Wi(T − 1;S)=Ci(E∗
i;T−1)+Di(S∗
T−1)+  ˜ Wi(T;S∗
T−1) (17)
which is country i’s part in the optimal total discounted costs, taking into account the
transfers and the resulting cooperation expected in T.









  =V(T − 1;S): (18)
6 Note that, following Chander and Tulkens (1997, Section 5), one could indeed obtain the cooperative
optimum with transfers as an equilibrium, called ratio-equilibrium.
7 Since the value functions ˜ Wi(T;ST−1) contain transfers that sum up to zero, convexity of the cost
functions Ci and Di does not ensure that the objectives in (14) are convex, unlike what happens for T.I n
Section 5, we present a numerical algorithm that allows to check the second-order conditions at each period.86 M. Germain et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 79–99
V(T − 1;S) − W(T − 1;S) measures the ecological surplus induced by extending co-
operation to period T − 1, with respect to the alternative scenario where cooperation
is limited to T. However, (18) is again not su cient to induce cooperation at time
T − 1. If ∃i∈N such that Wi(T − 1;S)¿V i(T − 1;S), then country i will not want
to extend cooperation to period T − 1 without  nancial compensation.
To induce country i to participate in T − 1, we proceed as in period T. Let
 i(T − 1;S)=−[Wi(T − 1;S) − Vi(T − 1;S)]
+ i;T−1[W(T − 1;S) − V(T − 1;S)] (19)
be the transfer paid or received by country i at time T − 1, where  i;T−1 ∈]0;
1[;∀i∈N and
 n
i=1  i;T−1 = 1. Then country i’s total cost including transfers
becomes
˜ Wi(T − 1;S)=Wi(T − 1;S)+ i(T − 1;S): (20)
By construction, the budget of the transfers de ned by (19) is balanced (i.e.  n
i=1  i(T − 1;S) = 0). Furthermore, it is easy to see that these transfers make
cooperation individually rational at time T − 1, whatever the inherited stock of
pollutant S.
The preceding analysis can be repeated for all earlier periods. The  nal result will
be that the countries cooperate in each period. This determines the emission levels in
each period and also the trajectory of the stock of pollutant, given its initial value
S0. In turn this trajectory determines the values of the functions Vi, Wi and ˜ Wi, and
therefore also the values of the transfers  i. In Section 4 it will be shown that these
transfers yield an interesting property from the perspective of cooperative game theory
for speci c values of  i.
In the in nite horizon case, the backward reasoning considered above applies no
more. However, we can consider the stationary solution by taking advantage of the
fact that the cost functions Ci and Di as well as the sharing parameters  i do not
depend directly on time. The functional forms of the solutions thus only vary in time
through the varying stock of pollutant S. The structure of the problem is then the same
as in the  nite horizon case.
4. Transfers to sustain coalitional rationality at the international optimum
The only condition so far on the  i’s appearing in (11)o r( 19) is to take values
between 0 and 1 and to sum up to 1. The aim of this section is to utilize the de-
grees of freedom left to obtain the property of “coalitional rationality” suggested by
the core concept in cooperative game theory. We achieve this goal by extending to
dynamic games the results obtained by Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997) in a static
framework.M. Germain et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 79–99 87
4.1. Associating a dynamic cooperative game with the economic model
In general, a cooperative 8 game (with transferable utility) is de ned as a pair
[N;w(·)], where N={1;:::;n} is the set of players (i.e. the n countries), and w(·)i s
the characteristic function of the game, that is, a function that associates to every subset
(i.e. coalition) of N a real number called the worth of the coalition. In the present
dynamic context, we consider such a game at each point in time of our economic
model and we therefore specify a characteristic function wt(·;S t), at each t, where St
is the inherited stock of pollutant at that time. We then consider the sequence over
time of such cooperative games [N;w t(·;S t)], t =1 ;:::;T; this sequence de nes the
dynamic cooperative game that we 9 associate with our economic model.
4.2. Specifying the components of the dynamic game at each t
For each of the games [N;w t(·;S t)] to be fully speci ed, the characteristic functions
wt(·;S t) should further state: (i) what the strategies are that the players (countries) have
access to, individually and as coalitions; (ii) which strategy they will actually choose;
and (iii) the worth each coalition may expect from using its chosen strategy. As all
this will be de ned for a given time t, we drop from now on the time index until
further notice, letting all emissions and stock variables be those of time t, except
for   S which denotes the stock inherited from the past, St−1.
As to (i), we assume that the strategy space for each country i is the interval of
possible emission levels Ei at time t, i.e. [0;∞[, and for each coalition U ⊆ N the
product of |U| of these intervals, where |U| denotes the number of countries in the
coalition U. As to (ii), when some coalition U ⊆ N forms (including singletons), we
consider that the vector EU of the strategies adopted by all players is as follows:
(a) The emissions of the coalition members are the vector {EU
i : i∈U} which is the









where ∀j∈N\U, Ej = EU
j as de ned by (b), and ˜ Wi(S) is de ned as in (20).
(b) The emissions EU
j , j∈N\U, of the countries outside of the coalition, are the
solutions that simultaneously solve the optimization problems
min
Ej




where ∀i∈U, Ei = EU
i as de ned by (a) and ˜ Wj(S) is also as in (20).
8 See, e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, p. 857). These authors use the more recent—and actually more
appropriate—alternative terminology of “coalitional game”.
9 Other concepts of dynamic cooperative games are discussed in Section 4.5.88 M. Germain et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 79–99
There are two assumptions present in this speci cation. The  rst one is
the “ -assumption”, 10 according to which if a coalition forms, its members together
minimize the sum of their discounted total costs (item (a)) while each country outside
of it reacts by minimizing its own individual discounted total cost, that is, by turning
to a natural fallback position (item (b)). The vector EU is thus of the nature of a
Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game where the players are the coalition U
and the individual countries outside the coalition taken as singletons. 11 Our second
assumption is the rational expectations assumption, introduced in the preceding section;
it is expressed here by the inclusion of ˜ Wi(S) and ˜ Wj(S) in the objective functions of
(21) and (22), respectively, to be minimized.





i )+Di(SU)+  ˜ Wi(SU)]; (23)
where SU =[ 1−  ]   S +
 n
i=1 EU
i . Note that w(N;S) is equal to W(S) as de ned in
(17), with t=T −1, i.e. to the optimal total cost for all countries together. The explicit
form of the characteristic function of the games [N;w t(·;S t)] is thus (23).
4.3. Imputations at each t
For any game [N;w(·;S)] so speci ed, any n-dimensional vector of which the com-
ponents sum up to w(N;S) is called an imputation of the game. An imputation can
thus be seen as a way of sharing the optimal total cost between the players.
The vector (W1(S);:::;W n(S)), where Wi(S) is de ned as in (17), is an example
of such an imputation, in which each country bears its own abatement and damage
costs as induced by the optimal strategy {E∗}. However, the possibility of  nancial
transfers between the countries implies that (an in nite number of) other imputations
exist, associated with the same strategy. Indeed, all vectors ( ˜ W 1(S);:::; ˜ Wn(S)) de ned
like (20), with
 
i  i(S) = 0, are imputations as well.
A solution of the game is an imputation that satis es certain properties. Among the
imputations de ned as (20), the ones that satisfy
 
i∈U
˜ Wi(S) 6 w(U;S) ∀U ⊆ N (24)
are said to belong to the  -core of the game. In words, the core is the set of imputations
with the property that each possible coalition bears a fraction of the total costs W(S)
less than or equal to w(U;S), i.e. the least cost that this coalition can guarantee for
itself. Imputations belonging to the core of the game de ned above are therefore called
“rational in the sense of coalitions” since the members of any coalition would su er a
total cost higher than the one at the optimum with transfers.
10 Borrowed from the concept of “ -characteristic function” introduced by Chander and Tulkens (1995,
1997).
11 This equilibrium is called by Chander and Tulkens a partial agreement Nash equilibrium with respect to
the coalition U. The authors show that such an equilibrium exists and is unique under assumptions similar
to those of our economic model.M. Germain et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 79–99 89
4.4. Transfers inducing  -core imputations at each t
Recall from Section 3 that E∗ was de ned as the vector of optimal emission
levels and S∗ as the optimal stock level, that EV was the vector of emission levels
and SV the stock characterizing the fallback non-cooperative equilibrium, and that
(W1(S);:::;W n(S)) and (V1(S);:::;V n(S)) were, respectively, the vectors of discounted
total costs at the optimum and at the fallback non-cooperative equilibrium (cf. (17)
and (15)), with W(S) and V(S) the sum of these vectors’ components. Recall also
that all variables mentioned here are de ned at time t.
For the game [N;w(·;S)], consider now the imputation ( ˜ W1(S);:::; ˜ Wn(S)) de ned
by
˜ Wi(S)=Wi(S)+˜  i(S) ∀i∈N; (25)
where ˜  i(S) is a transfer of the form
˜  i(S)=−[Ci(E∗
i ) − Ci(EV




j ) − Cj(EV
j )] (26)












Fi(S∗)=Di(S∗)+  ˜ Wi(S∗): (28)
We can now state the following.
Theorem. The imputation (25) belongs to the  -core of the game [N;w(·;S)], if one
of the following two conditions is satis ed:
(i) ∀i∈N, Di is linear, or




i ) − Ci(EV
i )] ¿ 0; (29)
where EU is the vector of emission levels at the partial agreement Nash equilibrium
with respect to coalition U.
Proof. Case (i) linear damage costs—is proven in Germain et al. (1998b). The proof
of case (ii) is given in Germain et al. (1998c) available from the authors upon
request. 12
12 Notice that the transfers (26) are formulated di erently than in (11)o r( 19). The  rst part of the proof
of case (ii) shows that the former with (27) and (28) are equivalent to the latter.90 M. Germain et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 79–99
4.5. Cooperative international optimum and alternative cooperative dynamic games
Turning back now to the cooperative dynamic game de ned in Section 4.1, i.e.
the sequence of games [N;w t(·;S t)], t =1 ;:::;T associated with the economic model
of Section 2, consider the internationally optimal trajectories of emissions and stock
de ned there together with, at each time t, the transfers de ned by (26)–(28).
These optimal trajectories, combined with  -core-theoretic transfers are the solution
we propose for the cooperative dynamic game. We call this combination the cooperative
international optimum. As we have argued above, this optimum is cooperative in a
rational expectations sense.
Recently, Kranich et al. (2001) have proposed three other core concepts for co-
operative dynamic games, called, respectively, the “classical”, the “weak sequential”
and the “strong sequential” cores. Each one of these core concepts derives from a
di erent form of the characteristic function, the di erences residing in the assump-
tions made on how “deviations” by coalitions may (or may not) occur over time.
Our characteristic function (and hence our core concept) is actually a fourth one, in
its dynamic aspects (independently of its   nature). It is based on the assumption
that if deviations occur at time t, they do not continue afterwards because from time
t+1 on, cooperation with our transfers is more bene cial for all than non-cooperation.
This rational expectations attitude assumed to be adopted by the players at time t,
was expressed summarily above as “noncooperation (i.e. deviation) at time t, fol-
lowed by cooperation afterwards”. Our characteristic function is thus a “rational ex-
pectations characteristic function”, and hence our core concept a “rational expectations
core”.
Referring to the formulation proposed in another paper by Filar and Petrosjan (2000),
it seems to us that the economic model to which our dynamic games are associated
implies (through the role played by the stock externality) that, in the notation of these
authors (their Eq. (2.1)), the function v at time t + 1 is determined by the solution
retained at time t, that is, along the cooperative international optimum we have de ned,
by the Pareto optimal stock prevailing at t. We thus present an application of the model
of dynamic games of these authors.
4.6. Two further comments
The transfers (26) used in the theorem are the sum of two components. The  rst
term in the right-hand side of (26) is either (if ¿0) an amount received by country
i equal to the increase of its abatement costs due to its cooperating behaviour during
this period, or (if ¡0) a payment made by country i equal to its savings in abatement
costs, in the case where cooperation allows for an increase in this country’s emissions.
The second term (always¡0) is country i’s contribution to cover the total cost of the
aggregate abatement e ort of the cooperating countries.
Other remarks concern condition (ii). Notice that it is a su cient, not a neces-
sary one. It requires, with (29), that if a coalition forms, the total of the abate-
ment costs of its members are larger than what this total would be at the fallback
non-cooperative equilibrium. How likely are such coalitions? In order for a coalition UM. Germain et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 79–99 91








[Fi(SU) − Fi(SV)] 6 0 (30)
since otherwise its members are all better o  at the fallback non-cooperative equilib-
rium. In (30) the magnitudes in the bracketed di erences under the second summation
sign are always negative, because SU is smaller than SV. Condition (ii) thus states
that a coalition U that forms can only oppose (25) if in addition the  rst sum in (30)
is negative, i.e. if the aggregate abatement costs of its members are lower than what
they are at the fallback non-cooperative equilibrium. 13 However, one may think that
the existence of such coalitions is unlikely because, as it is shown in the proof of the
theorem, the sum of the emissions of the members of any coalition is always lower
than what it is at the fallback non-cooperative equilibrium.
5. Computability issues
The aim of this section is to describe an original numerical algorithm that calculates
the value functions and the transfers when the cost functions Ci and Di are convex. An
original algorithm is indeed needed because in the backward induction with the com-
plex transfer parameters, the problem is not analytically tractable, contrary to number
of linear-quadratic problems in the literature (such as in M  aler and de Zeeuw, 1998,
for example). It is written for  nite horizon problems, which is appropriate for most
practical applications. The emissions and stock trajectories associated with the interna-
tional optimum can be calculated by traditional nonlinear programming techniques. The
transfers are more di cult to calculate, because they make use of values calculated at
the fallback non-cooperative equilibrium, so that one must proceed by backward induc-
tion. The basic idea is to construct explicit approximations for the surfaces ˜ Wi(t;St−1),
i∈N, as polynomial functions of St−1, by using classical regression.
5.1. Statement of the algorithm
The algorithm consists of several steps:
Step 1: The algorithm starts by solving the optimization problem (2) associated with












  )=0 ∀i∈N;∀t ∈T (31)
and
S∗





it ∀t ∈T; (32)
13 In a static framework, Chander and Tulkens (1997) propose a condition on the marginal damages that
ensures that all members of a coalition decrease their emissions w.r.t. the non-cooperative equilibrium.
Adapted to our framework, this condition is that ∀U ⊂ N, U  = N, |U| ¿ 2,
 
i∈U F 
i (S∗) ¿ F 
j(SV),
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where C 
i and D 
j are the derivatives of functions Ci and Dj, respectively. Solving this
T(n + 1) equations yields the optimal values of the emissions and of the stock of
pollutant for all periods.
Step 2(a): To calculate the transfers, one must  rst solve the dynamic programming
problems associated with the fallback non-cooperative equilibrium. The algorithm pro-
ceeds backwards, starting from the last period. At the  nal time T, given the inherited
stock of pollutant S, the fallback non-cooperative equilibrium (which coincides with












 =0 ;i ∈N: (33)
Once this system of equations has been solved for the variables EN
jT, and knowing
by step 1 the optimal emissions at time T, it is possible to calculate the transfers







T))) as well as the value functions
˜ Wi(S;T) using (25).
Step 2(a) is done for a set  T of given values of the inherited stock of pollutant
S. This set is chosen to be representative of the interval of possible values of S.
This interval is bounded below by the value of S that would be obtained with zero
emissions during periods 1;2;:::;T− 1, given S0, and bounded above by the value of
S that would be obtained with maximum emissions during the same period.
Step 2(b): We now assume that total costs with transfers at time T have the
following polynomial form:
˜ Wi(T;S)=kiT;mSm + kiT;m−1Sm−1 + ···+ kiT;0;i ∈N; (34)
where m is the order of the polynomial chosen so that the  t is good enough. To
identify the parameters kiT;m, kiT;m−1;:::;k iT;0, we use an ordinary least square regression
method implemented in the software Matlab, so that the functions ˜ Wi(T;S) are now
approximated with explicit analytical functions of S.
Steps 2(a) and (b) are then repeated for period T −1. Given (14) and the inherited



























 =0 ;i ∈N: (35)
Once this system of equations has been solved for the EV
j;T−1, knowing the optimal
emissions at time T − 1 (by step 1) and the value functions ˜ Wi(S;T) (by application
of steps 2(a) and (b) for time T), it is possible to calculate the transfers  i(S;T − 1)
using (26)–(28) and the value functions ˜ Wi(S;T − 1) using (25). This is done for a
set  T−1 of given values of the inherited stock of pollutant S, so that by regression ofM. Germain et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 79–99 93
Table 1
Optimal abatement rates (%) and atmospheric temperature changes (◦C)
t  1  2  3  T
1995 14.29 30.45 22.49 0.87
2005 14.47 28.74 23.08 1.00
2015 14.67 27.46 23.61 1.15
2025 14.94 26.50 24.09 1.29
2035 15.19 25.81 24.54 1.44
2045 15.37 25.31 24.96 1.59
2055 15.51 24.95 25.34 1.74
2065 15.63 24.70 25.68 1.89
2075 15.74 24.53 25.99 2.03
2085 15.83 24.42 26.28 2.18
2095 15.91 24.34 26.53 2.32
2105 15.98 24.29 26.76 2.47
the calculated values of the value functions ˜ Wi(S;T −1) on  T−1, the value functions
˜ Wi(S;T − 1) can be approximated with explicit analytical functions of S.
The algorithm continues backwards by repeating steps 2(a) and (b) until period 1.
Step 3: Once the value functions ˜ Wi are known as functions of S for all times of
the planning period T={1;:::;T}, the algorithm calculates the actual values of these
value functions and of the transfers for all countries all along the optimal trajectory
calculated at step 1.
5.2. A numerical example
In the following, we show some numerical results obtained by application of the
algorithm to a simple climatic change model with three regions and 30 periods (orig-
inally considered by Germain and van Ypersele (1999) in a six regions framework).
The three regions considered are Industrialized Countries (IC), 14 China and Rest of
the World (RW). Periods are decades, starting with decade 1990–2000. Details of the
equations and values of the parameters are given in Appendix A. The polynomials used
are of degree three.
First, by regressing the value functions ˜ Wi on a large set of possible values of
the inherited stock of pollutant S, we were able to verify that the objective function
of each country is well behaved and yields existence and uniqueness of the fallback
non-cooperative equilibrium at each period.
We show the results for a planning horizon extending over 11 periods (i.e. until
the end of the 21st century), but to avoid boundary problems, computations were
made until T = 30. 15 Table 1 shows the evolution of the optimal abatement rates of
emissions  i (i.e. the reduction of emissions induced by the optimal solution w.r.t.
the BAU scenario, see Appendix A) and atmospheric temperature (which is itself a
14 The region IC groups Europe, US, Japan and Former Soviet Union.
15 As t approaches T, results become meaningless because one ignores environmental damages after T.94 M. Germain et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 79–99
Table 2
Individual pay-o  di erences between fallback equilibrium (Vi) and optimal trajectories without (Wi) and
with ( ˜ Wi) transfers ( i) between the regions i = 1–3 (in billion 1990 US$)
tV 1 − W1 V2 − W2 V3 − W3  1  2  3 V1 − ˜ W1 V2 − ˜ W2 V3 − ˜ W3
1995 41.63 −12.76 51.65 10.34 −17.25 6.91 31.30 4.48 44.73
2005 41.26 −11.44 51.17 11.09 −16.13 5.04 30.17 4.69 46.13
2015 40.42 −10.30 50.58 11.56 −15.16 3.60 28.86 4.86 46.98
2025 39.48 −9.34 49.67 11.97 −14.34 2.37 27.51 5.00 47.30
2035 38.44 −8.54 48.50 12.28 −13.64 1.36 26.17 5.09 47.14
2045 37.15 −7.86 47.20 12.35 −13.01 0.66 24.81 5.15 46.54
2055 35.62 −7.27 45.72 12.22 −12.42 0.20 23.41 5.15 45.52
2065 33.90 −6.75 44.04 11.93 −11.86 −0.07 21.97 5.11 44.11
2075 32.03 −6.28 42.16 11.51 −11.31 −0.20 20.52 5.03 42.36
2085 30.04 −5.86 40.09 10.98 −10.75 −0.23 19.05 4.90 40.32
2095 27.97 −5.45 37.83 10.38 −10.18 −0.20 17.59 4.72 38.04
2105 25.85 −5.06 35.43 9.72 −9.57 −0.14 16.14 4.51 35.57
function of the stock of CO2 in the atmosphere, see Appendix A). The evolutions
of the abatement rates are contrasting: increasing slowly for IC (indexed as 1 in the
table) and RW (indexed as 3), decreasing slowly for China (indexed as 2). Despite
the control of emissions, atmospheric temperature continues to increase monotonically
during the whole century. The increase of temperature amounts to around 2:5◦Ca tt h e
end of the 21st century compared to its preindustrial level.
The  rst three columns of Table 2 give the di erences between the pay-o s of the
three regions along the international optimum (without current transfers) and at the
fallback non-cooperative equilibrium, (Vi − Wi). Positive (negative) values mean that
the region is better (worse) o  at the optimum. While IC and RW are better o  in
each period, China is worse o  in every period. Thus, the international optimum does
not satisfy individual rationality.
The following three columns of Table 2 give the transfers  i received or paid by
each region to make the international optimum trajectory a cooperative one. A negative
(positive) value means that the transfer is received (paid). China receives at each period
a transfer that induces this country to cooperate. The principal donor is IC, but RW is
also a donor until the middle of the century. After 2060 RW also becomes a receiver,
but to a far less extent than China.
That these transfers are su cient to induce cooperation from all regions at all periods
is shown by the last three columns of Table 2, which give for each region the di erence
between its pay-o  at the cooperative optimum (i.e. with current transfers) and at the
fallback non-cooperative equilibrium (Vi − ˜ Wi). All values are positive which means
that all regions (in particular China) win from cooperation at all periods. In other
words, taking into account that cooperation prevails after t, all regions are induced to
extend cooperation to current period t thanks to current transfers at period t.
Table 3 reports on di erences between the pay-o s obtained by coalitions along the
international optimum (with and without transfers) and at the partial agreement Nash
equilibria w.r.t. these coalitions (as de ned in Section 4.1). The purpose is to checkM. Germain et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 79–99 95
Table 3
Coalition pay-o  di erences between partial agreement Nash equilibria w.r.t. coalitions (V(·)) and optimal
trajectories without (W(·)) and with ( ˜ W(·)) transfers (In billion 1990 US$. Coalitions: I;R: IC and RW;
C;R: China and RW; I;C: IC and China.)
tV C;R − WC;R VC;R − ˜ WC;R VI;R− WI;R VI;R− ˜ WI;R VI;C− WI;C VI;C− ˜ WI;C
1995 27.75 38.08 68.69 51.45 21.32 28.23
2005 28.27 39.36 66.88 50.75 23.18 28.22
2015 28.56 40.12 65.26 50.10 24.24 27.84
2025 28.39 40.36 63.80 49.47 24.85 27.23
2035 27.89 40.17 62.42 48.78 25.11 26.47
2045 27.24 39.58 60.93 47.93 24.91 25.57
2055 26.407 38.62 59.26 46.84 24.34 24.55
2065 25.39 37.31 57.35 45.49 23.47 23.40
2075 24.21 35.72 55.17 43.85 22.36 22.16
2085 22.90 33.88 52.70 41.95 21.08 20.85
2095 21.47 31.85 49.97 39.79 19.67 19.47
2105 19.97 29.69 46.99 37.42 18.20 18.06
coalitional rationality. It turns out that, according to Columns 1, 3 and 5, no coalition
can do better by itself than what it obtains at the international optimum. Coalitional
rationality is thus satis ed without transfers. But this property is particular to this
example and parameter values: indeed, it is not satis ed in other similar cases, as for
example in Eyckmans and Tulkens (1999), where coalitional rationality only obtains
with  nancial transfers.
5.3. Comparing open-loop and close-loop models
It is interesting to compare the negotiation process described in this paper with the
open-loop case, where the countries negotiate once and for all at the beginning of
the planning period. Germain et al. (1998a) have de ned the following transfers that























it (i∈N;t∈T) is the emission of country i at time t characterizing the
non-cooperative open-loop Nash equilibrium. 16 Table 4 summarizes the results.
Columns 1 and 2 give the total discounted costs for each region at the optimum
(Wi(S0)) and at the non-cooperative open-loop Nash equilibrium (Oi(S0)). It is clear
that China has no interest to cooperate without  nancial compensation. Column 3 gives
16 Not to be confused with the feedback Nash equilibrium de ned in Section 3.96 M. Germain et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 79–99
Table 4
Comparison with the open-loop case
iW i(S0) Oi(S0)  i(S0) Wi(S0)+ i(S0)
 
t  i(t;St−1)
IC 10352.0 10839.4 284.4 10636.4 202.3
CHINA 2321.5 2159.0 −240.1 2081.5 −222.1
RW 20078.9 20627.6 −44.3 20034.6 19.9
the transfers  i(S0) calculated by formula (36). With these transfers, it appears from
the comparison of columns 2 and 4 that all regions gain from cooperation. Finally,
column 5 gives the sum of transfers given or received by the three regions all along
the planning period in the closed-loop case. Comparison of columns 3 and 5 shows
that although of the same magnitude, the transfers given by IC and RW to compensate
China are di erent in the closed-loop framework than what they are in the open-loop
case.
The closed-loop case in general leads to di erent results than the open-loop case.
The reason is that the closed-loop case allows for more strategic behaviour because
the countries observe the stock of pollution at each point in time and condition their
emissions on these observations. When a country considers to increase emissions, this
country will argue that it leads to a higher stock and thus to less emissions by the other
countries, which then partly o sets the increase. Therefore, in equilibrium, emissions
will be higher in the closed-loop case than in the open-loop case.
In the model of this paper two e ects in uence the transfers when compared to the
open-loop case. On the one hand, the closed-loop case leads to more emissions so
that more transfers are needed. On the other hand, since the construct with a fallback
equilibrium assumes cooperation in the future, it brings the outcome closer to the
full-cooperative one, so that less transfers are needed.
One cannot say a priori whether the closed-loop case leads to higher or lower trans-
fers than the open-loop case. It is clear that when the solutions coincide, the transfers
are the same. This occurs when the damage function is linear, as shown in Germain
et al. (1998b), because in that case emissions do not depend on the stock.
6. Conclusion
This paper develops transfer schemes that yield both individual and coalitional ratio-
nality for the design of international agreements that seek to achieve global optimality
in stock pollutant control problems, in case these agreements can in principle be ne-
gotiated at each point in time. The paper also provides an algorithm to calculate the
transfers, whose functioning is illustrated by a numerical example applied to the climate
change problem in the context of a partition in three regions of the world.
Our approach presents nevertheless some limits, that invite to further research. First,
the transfer scheme is supposed to guarantee the cooperative outcome simply because
it makes cooperation bene cial for all countries. It would be interesting to drop thisM. Germain et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 79–99 97
hypothesis and try to sustain the cooperative outcome as a non-cooperative equilib-
rium. Another track of research would be to study what happens when, for one reason
or another, a country deviates from the international agreement at a certain period.
Technical work could also be done on the algorithm. Its main strengths are its relative
simplicity and its ability to solve problems that are not linear-quadratic, but it is limited
to one state variable problems and several mathematical questions could be deepened
(for example the question of the propagation of numerical errors due to the successive
regressions).
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where Eit is the CO2 emissions of region i at time t,  it the CO2 emissions/output
ratio (exogenous), Yit the output (exogenous),  it the control rate of the emissions, St
the stock of CO2 in the atmosphere,  Tt the variation of the atmospheric temperature
(w.r.t. to its preindustrial level), Cit the abatement costs, Dit the damage costs.
The value of the parameters S0 = 590 billion tons of carbon (preindustrial level),
  =0 :0833 (rate of decay of CO2 in the atmosphere between two periods),   =0 :64
(marginal atmospheric retention ratio of CO2),  =2:5=ln(2), annual discount rate=0:02.98 M. Germain et al./Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 28 (2003) 79–99
Parameters of the cost and damage functions are as follows:
i IC CHI RW
ai1 0.07 0.15 0.1
ai2 2.887 2.887 2.887
bi1 0.01102 0.015523 0.02093
bi2 1.5 1.5 1.5
Output (Yit) and CO2 emission/output ratio time series are borrowed from Germain
and van Ypersele (1999). 17
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